@RealEyesRealizeRealLies That doesn’t really make sense. While I agree with the underlying fallibilism (that is, the view that we ultimately cannot be certain), I disagree with the distinction you seem to be making between truths and facts. There is a distinction, but not the one you seem to be drawing.
Truth is a property of (some) sentences. More specifically, it is a property of a certain kind of sentence (namely, an assertion) under certain conditions (namely, when the assertion accurately describes the state of affairs at which it is aimed). Facts, meanwhile, are states of affairs (that is, a way that the world is). True sentences, then, are those that accurately describe facts.
When someone says ”x is a fact,” what they are asserting is ”x accurately describes a particular state of affairs.” Sure, that assertion may be incorrect. But it is no more or less incorrect than saying ”x is true.” So if one is acceptable in ordinary language, the other one must be acceptable as well.
This is especially the case considering the “at which it is aimed” rider that was included above. If I tell someone who is looking into my refrigerator that “there’s no beer,” I am not correctly understood as saying that there is no beer anywhere in the universe. My comment is implicitly restricted to the refrigerator (and possibly to my home as a whole unless I clarify an alternate location).